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FEDERAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE STATUTES:
THE NEED TO GUARANTEE A PROMPT TRIAL*
KENNETH KANDARAS**
INTRODUCTION

Property is often the subject of an offense or the instrumentality by which
an offense is committed. In offenses such as smuggling undeclared goods," or
using a vehicle to transport counterfeit money,2 firearms3 or controlled substances, 4 the involvement of property is an essential element of the offender's
scheme. Civil forfeiture statutes define the circumstances in which property is

forfeited to the government as a result of its unlawful use.5 Designed to deter

and penalize the commission of an offense, forfeiture statutes generally make
6
no distinction between the property interests of the guilty and the innocent.
Property is forfeited as a result of its unlawful use without regard to the

owner's criminal culpability.7 For the owner guilty of the underlying offense,
forfeiture is an added penalty for wrongdoing and deprives the offender of the
tools of his trade thereby curbing future offenses.3 In the case of an innocent

*Copyright 1981 by Kenneth Kandaras.
**B.A., Southern Illinois University, 1970; J.D., DePaul University, 1973. Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Ms. Carol Belshaw and Mr. Peter Borzeka in the preparation of this article.
1. 19 U.S.C. §§1594, 1595(a) (1976) (vessels and vehicles used to violate customs-revenue
laws may be seized).
2. 49 US.C. §782 (1976) (any vehicle, vessel, or craft used to transport contraband
narcotics, firearms, or counterfeit money may be seized). See generally Note, Operation of
FederalProvisionsGoverning Forfeiture of Vehicles Used in Violating FederalLaws, 27 NoTRE
DAMn LAW. 433 (1952).

3. 49 U.S.C. §782 (1976).
4. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(3) (1976) (any containers or conveyances used to traffic in controlled
substances may be seized).
5. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §1963 (1976) (providing for the forfeiture of property used in a
criminal enterprise but contingent on the criminal conviction of the property user). See
generally Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for
Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing,34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law -Banished At Last?, 62 CoUrN= L. REv. 768 (1977).

6. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974).
7. Id. at 680-88; accord, Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S.
577, 581 (1930) (the offense is attached to the distillery without regard to the personal misconduct of the owner).
8. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974). "Forfeiture
of conveyances that have been used - and may be used again - in violation of the narcotics
laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing
further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering
illegal behavior unprofitable." Id. Accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (the object of a forfeiture proceeding is to act as a penalty for the
commission of an offense and is quasi-criminal in character); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
465, 467-68 (1926) (the forfeiture of property is a secondary defense against the commission
of offenses and dispenses with the need to prove collusion between the wrongdoer and
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property owner, forfeiture in theory, is justified because it induces the owners
to exercise caution and avoid the bailment of property to those who may
violate the law.9 Presently, forfeiture statutes apply to a wide range of subject
areas including customs,10 immigration," internal revenue, 2 and conservation.' 3
Generally forfeiture statutes share a common mode of procedure. The
operation of forfeiture is illustrated by its use in customs law. 14 Unlawfully
imported goods or vehicles used in their importation are seized when probable
cause exists to believe they are subject to forfeiture.15 Thereafter, the government must initiate an in rem forfeiture proceeding.:6 From seizure to final adjudication the government has the sole right to possess the property.' 7 Significantly, the owner's only opportunity to contest the merits of the government's claim is the hearing attendant to the in rem proceeding. Thus, if the
government unreasonably delays the filing of the lawsuit, the owner is
hampered in asserting his defense to the forfeiture. The absence in forfeiture
statutes of procedural safeguards guaranteeing the property owner a prompt
hearing upon seizure of his property raises serious questions of fairness and
constitutional protection.
This article focuses on civil forfeiture statutes and the property owner's
due process right to a prompt initiation of judicial proceedings. The judicial
treatment of this right has revolved around two principal issues: first, the
remedy available to a property owner whose right to a timely hearing has
been violated; and second, the timetable mandated by the due process clause.
This article discusses the various approaches that have evolved in response to
these issues and suggests that only one approach, that which bars forfeiture
in the event the government unreasonably delays initiation of proceedings,
satisfactorily insures the owner's right to a hearing without unduly obstructing
the government.
PROCEDURE UNDER FORFEITURE STATUTES

-

THE NEED FOR A REMEDY AND A TIMETABLE

Forfeiture statutes generally do not provide a specific time limit within
which the government must initiate judicial proceedings after the seizure of
the alleged innocent owner); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)
(the forfeiture of property is fixed in this country's punitive and remedial jurisprudence).
9. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. 8 U.S.C. §1324(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (applicable to the forfeiture of vessels, vehicles,
and aircraft used in bringing in and harboring illegal aliens).
12. 26 U.S.C. §§7301-7303 (1976) (property intended for use in violating provisions of
the internal revenue laws).
13. 16 U.S.C. §1860(a) (1976) (Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976). See
generally Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REv. 513 (1977).
14. See note 1 supra.
15. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Nova, 560 F.2d 464, 467-70 (Ist Cir. 1977).
16. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text, infra.
17. 19 U.S.C. §1605 (1976).
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property. After seizure, a customs officer must notify the property owner and
all other persons with an interest in the property, either by publication"' or
personal notice,"9 of the seizure and the government's intent to seek forfeiture
of the property.
Customs reporting procedures depend upon the value of the seized
property. If the value exceeds $10,000, the officer must promptly transmit a
report to the United States attorney, which must include the results of the
officer's investigation into the property's alleged unlawful use. 20 The United
States attorney must then initiate judicial forfeiture proceedings if he determines the forfeiture claim is meritorious. 21 If the property's value does not
exceed $10,000, the customs officer and United States attorney need follow this
procedure only if the owner files a claim to the property and posts a bond
sufficient to insure payment of the government's court costs in the subsequent
proceeding 22 Property in this latter category is summarily forfeited if the
23
owner's claim and bond are not timely filed.
A judicial forfeiture action proceeds like any other civil claim. The

parties are entitled to discovery and to a jury trial. Pending trial, of course,
the appropriate customs officer has the sole right to possess the property. 24
Therefore, the government maintains exclusive possession of the property from
seizure to final adjudication based solely upon a finding that the govern-

ment has probable cause to believe the property is subject to forfeiture.
The property owner may have a meritorious defense. For example, the
owner may avert forfeiture by proof of innocence and reasonable efforts to
prevent the property's unlawful use. In Calero-Toledov. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.,2 5

the Supreme Court stated that no legitimate purpose could be served by
forfeiting the property of an "owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done
18. 19 U.S.C. §1607 (Supp. 11 1978) (notice by publication of government's seizure and
intent to forfeit property valued at less than $10,000). Notice by publication, however, may
violate the owner's right to due process if under the circumstances it is not reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice of the impending forfeiture. See Robinson v. Hanrahan,
409 U.S. 34, 40 (1972) (per curiam) (involving a state forfeiture statute); Menkarell v. Bureau
of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1972); Jackel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993, 99899 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally Note, Forfeiture Proceedings-In Need of Due Process,
3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 353-55 (1975).
19. 19 C.F.R. §162.31(a) (1979) (written notice to any individual who the facts of record
indicate has an interest in the seized property).
20. 19 U.S.C. § §1603, 1610 (Supp. II 1978).

21. Id. §1604 (1976).
22. Id. §§1607, 1608 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). The $10,000 threshold figure, contained in
§1607, is the result of a 1978 amendment that increased the figure from $2,500 to its
present level. Congressional history indicates that the increase was necessary to keep pace
with the rising value of automobiles and other merchandise. S. REP. No. 95-778, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2211, 2232.
23. 19 U.S.C. §1609 (1976); see Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Jary Leasing Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y.

1966).
24. See note 17 supra.

25. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
26
property."
Depending upon the particular statute, forfeiture is contingent on the
government's demonstration that the owner is, in some degree, criminally
culpable. In United States v. United States Coins & Currency,27 the Supreme
Court considered the forfeiture provisions of the internal revenue laws and
concluded that Congress intended to limit forfeitures to cases where owners
had significant criminal involvement in the wrongful use of the property. 28
Though the decision was limited to the internal revenue laws, the Court's conclusion is applicable to any federal forfeiture statute providing for the administrative return of property seized from an owner who was either innocent
of or excusably negligent 29 with respect to the wrongful use of the property.
An owner may also defend against forfeiture on constitutional grounds.30
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania31 the Court held that the ex-

clusionary rule bars the government from seeking forfeiture of property where
32
the seizure violates the fourth amendment.
The defense may also relate to the sufficiency of the evidence. Custom law
provides that the owner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the property was not unlawfully used. 3 The owner can
avoid forfeiture by meeting this burden of proof.
To the property owner the consequence of unnecessary delay in the initiation of the forfeiture proceeding may be severe. The seized property is often
quite valuable,3 4 and the actual delay between seizure and filing may be a
26. Id. at 689.
27. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
28. Id. at 719, 721-22.
29. Id. at 721-22.
30. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
31. But see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (federal forfeiture action allowed
though property was seized unconstitutionally by state law enforcement officers and transferred to federal officers).
32. 19 U.S.C. §1615 (1976).
33. See Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Eight Rhodesian
Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Kandaras, supra note 5, at 932.
54. The following cases illustrate the actual delay experienced by an owner after
seizure of his property. Appropriate reference is made to those cases in which the court held
the delay unconstitutional. Unless otherwise indicated, the time reflects the period from
the property's seizure to commencement of judicial forfeiture proceedings. United States
v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (11 months held unconstitutional);
United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977) (5 months);
United States v. One 1972 Mercedes-Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1976) (131/2 months
from the automobile's seizure to the close of the pleadings); United States v. One Motor
Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d. 1112 (Ist Cir. 1975) (12
months); United States v. One
1972 Wood 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (10 months); States Marine
Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (16
months from seizure of cargo
from a commercial vessel to claimant's suit seeking its return); Sarkisian v. United States,
472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.) (14 months held unconstitutional in seizure of jewelry), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973); In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930) (12 months from seizure of
utensils used in brewery to claimant's suit for return); United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone
Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (16 months held unconstitutional); United States
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year or longer. 35 Thus, for the owner with a meritorious defense, the government's delay needlessly forestalls the recovery of his property. During this
interim period, the owner may be wholly unable to secure property suitable as
a substitute.
Decisional law has introduced one element of due process that protects
the owner's property rights. Due process requires that the government convene
an immediate post seizure hearing to determine if the government had probable cause to seize the property.3 6 The hearing guards against the erroneous
seizure of property by requiring the government to adduce facts sufficient
to substantiate the seizure and allowing the owner an opportunity to rebut those
facts3 7 The hearing, however, is limited to the preliminary concern of probable
cause. The owner's right to litigate the merits of the forfeiture claim is
postponed until the government initiates judicial proceedings.
The absence of specific temporal requirements within which the government must initiate suit serves a legitimate purpose. After the seizure, the
government must thoroughly investigate the property's alleged unlawful use
and determine the likely success of a forefeiture suit.38 Because the factual
complexity of each case varies, in many instances the government would be
unable to complete a thorough investigation within a predetermined time
limit. In lieu of a fixed period, customs law utilizes general phrases to describe the speed with which each stage of the forfeiture process must proceed.
After the seizure, the appropriate customs officer must "promptly" report the
seizure to the United States attorney. 9 The United States attorney must make
a factual inquiry, and initiate forfeiture proceedings "without delay."4 o
No matter how the government interprets the statutory timetable, it is
still obliged to initiate judicial forfeiture proceedings within a period that
satisfies the property owner's right to due process. The due process clause
guarantees a property owner the right to an evidentiary hearing before the
government terminates his property rights, 41 and the United States Supreme
Court has held that this hearing must occur within a meaningful time and in
v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (11 months held unconstitutional); United States v. One 1973 Ford LTD, 409 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1976) (14
months); United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel Winds Will, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.
Fla. 1975) (at least 11 months), aff'd, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1971
Volvo 2-Door Sedan, 393 F. Supp. 843 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (2 months); United States v. A
Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (22 months held unconstitutional), aff'd, in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973) (20 months from the
automobile's seizure to trial); United States v. One 1971 Opel G.T., 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D.
Cal. 1978) (13
months held unconstitutional).
35. Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 38 (2d Cir. 1976). See Kandaras, supra note 5, at 936-39.
36. Kandaras, supra note 5, at 932-36.
37. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text, supra.
38. 19 U.S.C. §§1603, 1610 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
39. Id. §1604.
40. Id.
41. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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a meaningful manner. 42 Specifically, a hearing is not timely if the owner
suffers serious practical disabilities attributable to a delay. 43 In the area of
forfeiture, protection of the property owner's right to a timely hearing requires some safeguard that serves the dual purpose of reasonably insuring the
government's prompt initiation of forfeiture proceedings while not unduly
encumbering the government's law enforcement effort.
ProceedingsInstituted by the Property Owner:
The Castlebury/Behrens Approach
4
The decisions in Castlebury v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Division
45
and In re Behrens held that the government cannot unreasonably delay the
filing of the suit. In Castlebury an automobile owner claimed that the government unreasonably delayed initiation of forfeiture proceedings and sought an
injunction directing the property's return. The Fifth Circuit ruled that
officers with administrative or prosecutorial duties must have sufficient time
to complete their responsibilities.4" Implicit in the court's opinion is the
notion that government officers have a reasonable time, given the practical
demands of the case, to initiate forfeiture proceedings. In In re Behrens the
Second Circuit considered a similar request by a property owner and as with
4
Castlebury, fashioned a reasonable limitation upon government delay. 7
The remedy assigned for unreasonable governmental delay in Castlebury
and Behrens, however, was limited. In both cases the courts concluded that
the only recourse available to the owner is a suit to compel the government
to file judicial forfeiture proceedings. The trial court in that action must
then determine whether the government has any excuse for the delay. If the
court finds there is no justification for the delay, the government may be
ordered to initiate proceedings within a judicially prescribed deadline or to
abandon the forfeiture and return to property. 4" To remedy the owner's loss
of possession of property, the decisions stated that those owners who successfully defended their property against forfeiture may be entitled to money
damages. 49
The Castlebury and Behrens approach does not adequately guarantee
the owner's right to a timely hearing. While this right may be subject to
reasonable conditions, the requirement that the owner compel the government
to initiate proceedings serves no legitimate purpose. 50 The government is

42. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); accord, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55
(1979).
43. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 880 U.S. 545, 551 (1965).
44. 530 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1976).
45. 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930).
46. 530 F.2d at 676-77.
47. 39 F.2d at 564.
48. 530 F.2d at 677; 39 F.2d at 563-64.
49. 530 F.2d at 677; 39 F.2d at 564.
50. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374 (1971) (the owner
must refrain from contributing to any unnecessary delay). See also Lee v. Thornton, 538
F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976) (the owner must make a timely request for a hearing).
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under constitutional obligation to file suit in a timely manner. Castlebury and
Behrens acknowledge the owner's right to avoid unreasonable delay in the
filing of the suit and concede that government delay beyond the limit set by the
trial court bars forfeiture. But the supposition that the government must
previously be told by a court to do that which the Constitution independently
mandates gives insufficient content to due process protection. Little benefit is
derived from forcing the owner to bear the cost of an independent suit and
requiring a trial court to determine, in its own time-consuming manner, that
the government has already unreasonably delayed the start of the suit. 51
Castlebury and Behrens mistakenly rely upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Slocum v. Mayberry.52 The Slocum decision, rendered in 1817, held that
federal courts under the then existing embargo statute had exclusive jurisdiction to decide cases when the property was lawfully seized by a federal officer.
The embargo statute provided for the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of
vessels unlawfully used to transport goods. After disposing of the jurisdictional
issue, the Court stated that in the event a federal officer unduly delayed
initiation of judicial proceedings the district court had jurisdiction to provide
provisional relief by directing the officer either to file suit within a reasonable
time or abandon forfeiture. 53 Additionally, the Court noted that a federal
54
officer may be liable for damages if he wrongly detained the property.
There is ample reason to reject the Court's outlined remedy as the owner's
exclusive form of relief. In particular, the Slocum decision should be limited
to the jurisdictional question it decided. Slocum must be understood in the
context of the then existing tension over the definable limits of federal court
jurisdiction. At that time federal district courts lacked a general grant of
federal question jurisdiction. 55 As the remedy discussed by the Court did not
affect the outcome of the case, its inclusion may be viewed as an attempt by
the Court to elaborate on the federal district court's inherent power to enforce the embargo statute.5 6 In addition, the Court's treatment of provisional
5
relief and monetary damages was based solely upon statutory construction. 7
The owner did not raise, nor did the Court note the owner's right to due
process. The decision is devoid of any attempt to address the owner's constitutional right to a timely hearing.

51, See United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal.
1978). In response to the government's argument that the property owner could have avoided
the delay in initiating the suit by either demanding referral of the action to compel
reference of the case to the U.S. attorney or by filing some form of possessory action, the
court stated, "[An owner] ought not to be required to spend his own money to force the
government to take action which the government is bound by law to take and take
promptly." Id. at 205-06.

52. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id.
55. C. WRIGHT, A. MIt, & E. CoopER, FmDtAi. PRAGICE AND PROCEURE: JuRuISrboN

§8503 (1975).
56. See 15 U.S. at 3-4.

57. Hill,.ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 1109, 1129 n.91 (1969).
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UnreasonableDelay as a Bar to Forfeiture:
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs
The need for a more compelling remedy to insure observance of a property
owner's due process rights has prompted some courts to bar forfeiture in the
event of unreasonable governmental delay. This position draws its principal
support from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs.58 The Court there held that the seizure, under customs law, of
allegedly obscene material violated the first amendment because it failed to
provide for a swift adjudication of the controversy. To avoid the statute's
unconstitutionality the Court construed the statute to require the initiation of
forfeiture proceedings within fourteen days after seizure and the adjudication
of the suit within sixty days thereafter.5 9 Though the decision was limited
to the statute's first amendment implications, it has affected forfeiture litigation
in general by prompting courts to establish a timetable within which the
government must initiate suit and by treating the government's failure to
comply as a bar to the forfeiture. 60 Even within the general contours of this
relief, however, courts have reached different results.
In Sarkisian v. United States,61 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the seizure of imported jewelry "presents a constitutional claim of no less
dignity than that arising from . . . dirty pictures."62 Consequently, the court
held that customs law must. be interpreted to include the timetable provided
for in Thirty-Seven Photographs.63 But in State Marine Lines Inc. v. Schultz,64
the Fourth Circuit rejected the rationale of Sarkinsian and distinguished the
due process clause requirements from the first amendment protection in the
customs law forfeiture context. Rather than impose a rigid timetable like that
mandated in Thirty-Seven Photographs, the court held that the government
must file suit within a reasonable period after the property is seized. The
reasonableness of the intervening period was to be determined by the relative
complexity of the case and the government's explanation for the delay.6 5
The State Marine Lines decision has contributed in no small way to what
a district court in United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues66 described
as "A chorus of decisions holding that if the delay between the seizure and
commencement of district court proceedings is substantial, unexcused and
unreasonable, such delay will, on due process grounds, itself bar the government
from proceeding further."Or
58. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
59. Id. at 367-74.
60. See note 67 infra.
61. 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 472.
63. Id.
64. 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 1155.
66. 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
67. Id. at 204. See, e.g., United States v. One 1973 Buick Riveria, 560 F.2d 897, 901 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112, 1114 (1st Cir.
1975); United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (S.D. Ga. 1977);
Boston v. Stephens, 395 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. A Quantity of
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Under the post-Thirty-Seven Photographs cases the issue of unreasonable
delay may arise as an affirmative defense to the government's forfeiture suit.8
Therefore, unlike the remedy announced in Castlebury and Behrens, the
owner is not required to sue the government to protect his right to a prompt
trial, although the post-Thirty-Seven Photographs cases leave that option
available to the owner. 9
The Appropriate Timetable and Remedy
Courts have the inherent authority and responsibility to protect an individual's constitutional rights.70 Where Congress has provided no statutory
remedy, courts must fashion a remedy that substantially protects those rights.7 1
Thus, in Davis v. Passman7 2 the Supreme Court held that a remedy may be
implied directly from the fifth amendment due process clause where no statutory remedy exists. 73 Although the Court has more often considered whether
a damage recovery may be imposed to protect civil rights, the Court has
enumerated certain factors that must be considered in implying a constitutional
remedy. First, the remedy should be drawn from those traditionally available
to the courts;7 4 second, it should reasonably deter the constitutional violation;75 and third, the court should carefully consider any special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.7 6
In considering the appropriate remedy, an initial concern is whether a
court, under any circumstance, may bar the government's forfeiture for unreasonable delay. Certainly, courts have traditionally precluded a party's claim
based upon laches. 77 Actions in equity are dismissed without consideration of
the merits of the claim because of the claimant's failure to file his complaint
in a timely manner.78 Whether the Constitution requires such a remedy is a
separate inquiry.
Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. One 1971 Opel G.T., 360 F. Supp. 638, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Cf. United
States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1977) (based upon statutory
interpretation, unreasonable delay barred the government's forfeiture).
68. See United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112 (Ist Cir.
1975); United States v. One Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977); United
States v. A Quantity of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
69. Boston v. Stephens, 395 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
70. See Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitu-

tion as a Sword, 85 HARV.L. Rlv. 1532 (1972); Hill, supra note 55.
71. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971); Bell v. Hood,
U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
72. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
73. Id, at 245.
74. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971); Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).

75. See Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473-74 (1980); accord, Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 256-57, 257 n.11 (1977).
76. 442 U.S. at 246-47; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
77. J. PomERoY, EQUrry JUmRUDENcE §VIII(418) (1941).

78. "Laches in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage
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The post-Thirty-Seven Photographs cases and Castlebury/Behrens present
two conflicting approaches to the guarantee of a prompt hearing. On the one
hand, the post-Thirty-Seven Photographscases provide the only remedy suitable to deter the government from unreasonable delay. Under the ThirtySeven Photographs rationale the government is given a reasonable time to
prepare its forfeiture suit, and forfeiture is barred only if the government
cannot demonstrate that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances.
Thus, the threatened failure of the forfeiture proceeding works as a deterrent
to the government's violation of the owner's right to a prompt hearing.
The Castlebury/Behrensapproach, on the other hand, does not guarantee
a prompt hearing. The remedy requires that the owner undertake an independent suit to establish that the government has exceeded a reasonable delay.
This approach needlessly adds to trial courts' workloads and wrongly assumes
that owners are financially capable of pursuing the remedy.79 This approach,
however, is most defective in its assumption that the government should be
judicially reminded in every case of its constitutional duty to avoid delay. In
the vast majority of cases, the government is well aware of that duty.
Furthermore, a damage claim for violation of the owner's possessory rights,
the deterrent element of Castlebury/Behrens, is not satisfactory. Placing a
monetary value on the right to possess an object may be speculative in many
instances,80 and often the costs of litigation will far outweigh provable damages. Unlike a damage claim against a state official for violation of due process
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,81 an individual suing a federal officer is
not entitled to recover attorney's fees if he is ultimately successful. 82 As the
Supreme Court noted in Carey v. Piphus," the deterrent value of a damage
award for violation of a person's right to due process of law is intimately
related to the cost of retaining counsel to pursue the claim. Thus, when the
total cost of litigation is considered, it is unlikely that the owner will view a
damage award as a profitable remedy. Consequently, the damage claim provided for in Castlebury/Behrensis illusory. The Castlebury/Behrensapproach
lacks sufficient threat of punitive impact to deter government officers from excessive delay.
There are no special considerations that militate against barring forfeiture. The remedy does not lead to potential conflicts between the judiciary
to another .... When a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the
other it is a ground for denial (of a party's claim to relief)." Id. §419(d).
79. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). A serious question of due process is
raised whenever the right to a hearing is conditioned upon the individual's ability to satisfy
some financial requirement. Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1976); Lee v. Thornton,
538 F.2d 27, 32 n.3) (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the summary forfeiture of property conditioned upon the property's value and the owner's compliance with the bond requirement,
as mandated by 19 U.S.C. §1609 (1976), is unconstitutional as applied to persons financially
unable to comply with the bond provision).
80. See, e.g., Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981).
81. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1979).
82. 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976). See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
83. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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and the legislative or executive branch. Unlike the situation in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,s 4 the court need
not consider whether a damage recovery is ultimately one against the federal
government or an individual government officers 5 Nor must the court
consider a damage claim against a United States Congressman and the implications of the speech and debate clause as in Davis v. Passman.86 Further,
the propriety of barring the government's claim must be evaluated in light of
the many situations in which a party's failure to comply with procedural requirements bars the suit. A party's claim or defense may be stricken for failure
to comply with civil discovery provisions 7 or pretrial orders,8 or the plaintiff's
claim may be dismissed in the event he fails to prosecute his case diligently.8 9
In federal criminal proceedings the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 applies this
approach to the government's initiation of criminal suits.9 0 The remedy is
certainly not novel

As to the appropriate timetable, the fixed time limitations proposed in
Sarkisian v. United States are unwarranted. The Sarkisian court uncritically
equated ordinary personal property with property protected by the first amendment. In the latter area, the Supreme Court has long struggled over the issue
of pre-publication censorship and the inherent problem of defining when
the government may suppress publication of written material.91 The short
timetables and expedited trial schedule in Thirty-Seven Photographs are an
attempt to resolve the persistent problem of unlawful government censorship
in light of the government's need to control the importation of goods 9 2 To
ignore the distinction between the two forms of property is also to ignore
the role of the due process clause in ensuring the orderly adjudication of
property claims. Further, the wisdom of requiring that forfeiture cases be tried
within sixty days of their initiation seems wanting, particularly where a jury is
demanded. Nor can the case be made that the government, in every instance, is
capable of initiating proceedings within fourteen days after the seizure. 3
CONCLUSION

Because forfeiture statutes fail to protect a property owner's due process

right to a prompt post-seizure hearing, courts should fashion a remedy which
insures that right. While the remedy must accommodate the government's
84. 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see 435 U.S. at 257 n.11.
85.
86.
87.
88.

403 U.S. at 396.
442 US. at 246-47.
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).

89. FED. R. Civ. P. 410(); see J. F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard
Rail Co., 542 F.2d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1976).

90. 18 U.S.C. §§3161, 3162 (1976).
91. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-33 (1961); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1957).
92. 402 U.S. at 367-75.
93. See Castlebury v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Div., 530 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir.
1976); see notes 20-22 and accompanying text, infra.
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reasonable law enforcement needs, it should also deter government officers
from undue delay. The post-Thirty Seven Photographs cases, which bar
the government's forfeiture claim in the event of unreasonable delay, correctly
place upon the government the responsibility for guaranteeing the property
owner's due process right. At the same time, the government is given an adequate opportunity to pursue the forfeiture. And, unlike the Castlebury/Behrens
approach, the owner is not needlessly required to sue the government to
protect his constitutional rights. Though money damages may indeed compensate the owner for his actual economic loss, the relative cost of litigating
such a claim renders that remedy inadequate to guarantee that government
officers avoid unreasonable delay. Although a review of the Castlebury/Behrens
and the post-Thirty-Seven Photographs cases demonstrates that the circuit
courts diverge substantially on this question, the Supreme Court has recently
declined an opportunity to address the issue. 4 It is hoped that this article
has established the need for Supreme Court review and has laid the foundation for a rational choice among the divergent approaches.
94. United States v. Miller, 571 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 85 (1978)
(owner contended delay of 38 months from seizure to institution of judicial proceedings
violated due process).
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